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SECURITY TRANSFERS BY SECURED PARTIES
David G. Epstein*

HILE no Uniform Commercial Code section specifically so
provides, the Code clearly contemplates transfer by secured
parties of their interest arising under security agreements,1 and these
transfers commonly occur. Yet the legal ramifications of such transfers
are to a large extent unkno1m because of the silence of the Code and
the absence of both reported decisions and secondary authorities.2 This
article will examine one type of transfer by secured parties-transfers
by secured parties to secure payment of an indebtedness.

W

I.

TRANSFERS OF BOTH NOTE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT

A. Rights of Trans/eree
Generally in making such a transfer the secured party will transfer
both the note and the security agreement. '\.Vhere the transfer takes
this form, the transferee has two security interests: (1) An interest
in the property subject to the security agreement; and (2) an interest
in the note and security agreement themselves. The latter is commonly
called "chattel paper." Chattel paper is simply a writing which contains both a promise to pay and either a security interest in or lease
of goods.3 Often the promise to pay and the grant of the security
interest will be in separate writings. In such instances, the writings
taken together constitute "chattel paper."

(1) Transferee's Rights in the Collateral
As to his security interest in the collateral of the original security
agreement, the transferee is protected by section 9-302(2) of the Code
• Streich, Lang, Weeks, Cardon 8: French, Phoenix, Arizona. B.A., Unh'crsit)' of
Texas, 1964; LL.B., University of Texas, 1966; LL.M., Harvard Universil)", 1969. Member
of the Arizona and Texas Bars.
1 See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9·207(2)(c), 9-302(2), 9-405; 2 G. GU.MORE. SECU·
RITY !NTERESrS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 42.10, at 1155 (1965); Storkc, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commerdal Code and Colorado Security I.aw, 37 Cor.o. L. REV. ll, 22 (1964).
2 The principal discussions of transfers by secured panics :ippc:ir in 2 G. GiutOllE,
supra note I, at § 42.10 and Coogan, Kripke 8: Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9:
Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in llfont:)' and Deposits, Negatiue Pledge
Clauses, and Partidpation Agreements, 79 HARV. L. RE\'. 229, 266·74 (1965). As has been
observed, "[i]t is all but impossible to discuss ambiguous :ire:is in the present article 9
without finding that Mr. Coogan and Professor Gilmore, like Kilroy, b:t\'e been tl1cn:
before." Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds and Priorities,
41 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 687, 690 (1966).
3 Levie, Security Interest in Clzattd Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935 (1969); see UNcrorw
CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1)(6).
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from the mortgagor's creditors as long as the transferor's security in·
terest is perfected. Section 9-302(2) provides:
If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing

under this Article is required in order to continue the perfected
status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees
from the original debtor.
Nevertheless, it is advisable for the transferee to file an assignment
of security interest as provided in section 9-405(2).4
Note that section 9-302(2) only speaks to "creditors of . . . the
original debtor." It affords no protection from creditors of the transferring secured party. Thus, where S transfers the note and security
agreement of D to T, and T, relying on section 9-302(2), does not
cause a 9-405 assignment to be filed, the rights of the creditors of S
are superior to those of T. Furthermore, T's protection from the
creditors of D is at best imperfect. While section 9-302(2) seems to
make this perfection against the original debtor's creditors permanent,
apparently it is not. The transferor secured party can file a termination statement under section 9-404(1). 6 The filing of such a statement
results in the removal of the financing statement from the files. Since
the rationale underlying the Code's system of perfection by filing a
financing statement is that such filing affords sufficient notice to all
creditors, 6 it would seem that, upon removal of the financing stateUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-405(2) provides in relevant part as follows:
A secured party may assign of record all or part of his rights under a financing
statement by the filing of a separate written statement of assignment signed by the
secured party of record and setting forth the name of the secured party of record
and the debtor, the file number and the date of filing of the financing statement
and the name and address of the assignee and containing a description of the
collateral assigned. A copy of the assignment is sufficient as a separate statement
if it complies with the preceding sentence. • •.
G UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-404(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
Whenever there is no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to make
advances, incur obligations or otherwise give value, the secured party must on
written demand by the debtor send the debtor a statement that he no longer claims
a security interest under the financing statement, which shall be identified by file
number. A termination statement signed by a person other than the secured party
of record must include or be accompanied by the assignment or a statement by
the secured party of record that he has assigned the security interest to the signer
of the termination statement. • . •
See generally 1 H. BmNBAUlll, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM CO!llMERClAL
CODE § 12.10 (1954).
6 See National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone &: Co., 346 Mass. 255, 260·61, 191 N.E.2d
471, 474 (1963); UNIFORM CoMMERctAL CoDE § 9-402(1). Comment 2. See generally Ruud,
4
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ment from the files, the transferee is no longer protected against the
creditors of the original debtor. Thus, to maximize protection not
only against creditors of the original debtor but also against those
of his transferor, the transferee should file an assignment of security
interest under section 9-405(2).
(2) Transferee's Rights in the Chattel Paper
As to the security interest in the chattel paper, perfection is neces-

sary for protection against the transferor's creditors and assignees.
Perfection may be achieved either by possession7 or by filing. 8 However, perfection by possession is preferable since the rights of a secured
party who perfected by filing are subordinate to those of a purchaser
of chattel paper "who gives new value and takes possession of it in the
ordinary course of his business and without knowledge that the specific
paper ... is subject to a security interest ...."° Comment 2 to section 9-308 suggests that the nonpossessory lender may avoid this
danger by stamping the chattel paper with a legend indicating that he
has taken a security interest in it. 10 This, however, is at best an imperfect method of protection. In most instances of chattel paper financing, it will not be practical for each piece of paper to be brought to
the secured party for stamping.11 Thus, the secured party often must
rely on the debtor to perform this task; and the debtor may fail
intentionally or through inadvertence to properly stamp the paper.
The Perfection of Security Interests Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commerdal Code-How? When? Where? How Often?, 44 TEXAS L REv. 724, 729-33 (1966).
7 UNIFORM Cor.rMERCIAL CODE § 9-305; see Wiseman &: King, Perfection, Filing antl
Forms Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 WAYNE L RE\•. 560, 600-09
(1963).
s UNIFOR?.r Cor.mERCIAL CODE § 9-304(1); see Wiseman &: King, supra note 'l, at 609·18.
9 UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-308; see, e.g., '\\T. DAVENPORT &: R. HENSON, SEcuRED
'I°RANSAcnONs 68 (1966); Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uni/onn Commerdal Code
and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing''. 47 IOWA L REv.
289, 309-11 (1962). But cf. Levie, supra note 3, at 952.
10 In Burchett v. Allied Concord Financial Corp., 74 N.l\£. 575, 578, 39G P.2d lSG,
188 (1964), ~e court stated:
Although fully realizing that the official comments appearing as part of the
Uniform Commercial Code are not direct authority for the construction to be placed
upon a section of the code, nevertheless they are persuasive and represent the
opinion of the National Conference of Commissioners on Unifom1 State Laws and
the American Law Institute. The purpose of the comments is to explain the
provisions of the code itself, in an effort to promote uniformity o[ interpretation.
See Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Unifon11 Commerdal Code, 1965
WIS. L. REv. 597.
11 Chattel paper is usually generated by a manufacturer or dealer pursuant to a pl:in
of financing. Levie, supra note 3, at 935.
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B. Effect on Secured Party
Both logic and the basic framework of the Code seem to indicate
that transfer by a secured party of both the note and security agreement terminates all his rights, duties and interests thereunder. How·
ever, Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 12 the only reported case
that has directly considered the effect of a transfer of both the note
and security agreement on the secured party, seems to reach a contrary
result. There, defendant automobile dealer by written assignment
executed to the plaintiff bank a promissory note and conditional sales
contract received in the sale of a used car. Defendant agreed in the
assignment to repurchase the contract, if the automobile buyer defaulted in his obligation. The buyer subsequently defaulted after two
monthly payments, and plaintiff repossessed the automobile, notifying
the buyer by letter that it had done so. Fifteen days later, without
notice to either the buyer or defendant, plaintiff sold the automobile
by private sale to one of its customers for $75, thereby leaving an
unpaid balance of $277.88 due on the debt. Plaintiff instituted legal
proceedings against the defendant alone to recover the deficiency.
Defendant contended inter alia that plaintiff failed to give him notice
of the proposed sale and that such failure discharged his entire liability. The Arkansas supreme court upheld this contention. The court
based its decision on the conclusion that defendant was a debtor within
the meaning of section 9-504(3) of the Code. This section provides in
part:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification ... shall be sent by the secured party to
the debtor, and except in the case of consumer goods to any other
person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has
duly filed a financing statement ....13
As the car constituted consumer goods, 14 the defendant was not
entitled to notice by reason of being a secured party. Where the col·
lateral is nonperishable consumer goods, a debtor is the only party
entitled to notice.
240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966).
UNIFORM Collrl\IERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) (emphasis added).
14 See National Shawmut Bank v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484 (1967); Malllcoat
v. Volunteer Fin. 8: Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966); UNU'ORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(1).
12
13
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The court, in finding the defendant to be a debtor, stated:
[Defendant] was directly affected by the sale of the Oldsmobile;
the amount obtained in that sale fixed his pecuniary liability. In
simple fairness he should have had notice-a requirement entailing no real inconvenience or hardship to the bank.111
It is difficult to argue with the court's statement about fairness. Nevertheless, arguments can and have been made (by the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code among others)1 6 that t11e
defendant was not a debtor as to the automobile. 17
The Code's treatment of the term "'debtor" is somewhat confusing.
Section 9-105(d) provides that "'Debtor' means the person who owes
payment or other performance of the obligation secured . . . and
includes the seller of ... chattel paper."18 Debtor, however, is a relative term and is meaningless unless related either to the transaction
out of which the debt arose or to the collateral which secures the debt.
There is no denying that in Norton the defendant was a debtor within
the broad meaning of the Code because he sold chattel paper. However, when section 9-504 provides that a debtor is entitled to notice
upon the sale of the collateral, it must be understood to mean that
only the debtor whose debt is secured by the collateral to be sold is
15 Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 148, 398 S.W.2d 538, 541
(1966).
16 Id. at 147-48, 398 S.W.2d at 541.
17 Aside from the court's plea to fundamental fairness, its ration:ile for classif)ing the
defendant as a debtor is not convincing. The court stated that defendant was a debtor
because he owed "other performance of the obligation," within the meaning of section 9105(d). Defendant, however, had no duty to perform the automobile buyer's obligation.
Defendant's only duty was to purchase the chattel paper from the plaintiff, if tl1e auto·
mobile buyer defaulted. Certainly this cannot be construed as performance of tlte
buyer's obligation.
The Norton court might well have reached its goal of fairness '\itl1out fucing the
question whetlter defendant was a "debtor." Undisputed evidence indicated tltat plain·
tiff's uniform custom had been to give defendant an opportunit)' to n:purch35C his
contract and that previously defendant had never failed to do so when asked. See Brief
for Harry Meck as Amicus Curiae at 8·9, Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240
Ark. 143, 398 s.w.2d 538 (1966). According to UNIFORM Co?>rMERCIAL CoD& § 2·202(a) and
Comment 2 thereunder, a course of dealing or usage or trade that explains or supplements a contract is considered competent evidence of tltc party's intent and can become
part of the contract.
18 UNIFOR!>I COMMERCIAL COD& § 9-105(l)(d). The Code definition is also confwing in
that it encompasses not only tltc party owing tltc indebtedness but also tlte part)'
giving the security where the two parties arc not identical. The Code's definition or
debtor is criticized in Mellinkoff, The Language of the Unifonn Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 185, 198-99 (1967).

532

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:527

entitled to notice. Thus in Norton the automobile buyer was the only
debtor entitled to notice upon sale of the Oldsmobile. A transferor
secured party should not be regarded as a debtor of the obligation
transferred.

II.

TRANSFER OF ONLY THE

NoTE

The transfer is not always of both the security agreement and the
note.19 A secured party may transfer or assign only the note, retaining
the security agreement. The effect of such a transaction is far from
clear. This practice brings to mind the observation of Lord Devlin:
Businessmen have always given a lot of work to lawyers for they
do not bother much about the agreements they make until
something goes wrong. This habit of mind distresses the lawyers.
They look upon the bits of paper which the litigants produce
with as much enthusiasm as a doctor surveys a row of patent
medicine bottles out of which his patient has been dosing himself. 20
A. Transferee's Rights as to Note
If the transfer of the note is absolute, then the transferee's rights
as to the note would be those of a holder under Article 3.21 If, however, the transfer was to secure an obligation of the transferor, the
perfection sections of Article 9 are also relevant: a promissory note
comes within the Code's collateral classification of "instrument. " 2 ll
Section 9-304 is the only Code provision that speaks to the matter of
perfection of security interests in instruments. Paragraph one thereof
provides that, subject to two specific exceptions, "[a] security interest
in instruments (other than instruments which constitute part of chat·
tel paper) can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession ...." 23 The parenthetical phrase is somewhat confusing in the
context of a note-only transfer. The note is part of chattel paper in
the sense that, coupled with the security agreement, it "evidence[s]
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in . . . specific
goods. " 24 There is, however, no means specified in the Code for
perfecting an instrument which is part of chattel paper. Thus, it
See Levie, supra note 3, at 935. But cf. 2 G. GILMORE, sup1•a note 1, at 1156 n.5.
P. DEVUN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 5 (1962).
21 See Note, The Concept of Holder in Due Course in Article III of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1573 (1968).
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9·105(g). But cf. Mellinkoff, supra note 18, at 194.95,
23 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304(1).
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9·105(b).
19

20
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would seem that either the parenthetical in section 9-304(1) is applicable only to transfers of both the note and the security agreement, or it
is not possible to perfect a security interest in a note which is part of
chattel paper. An examination of the effect of a note-only transfer on
the security reveals a third possibility.
B. Transferee's Right to Security
No Code provision or comment deals with the effect on the security
of a note-only transfer. Furthermore, there is considerable division
of opinion as to the method by which unforeseen gaps in the Code
should be filled. On the one hand, Dean Hawkland considers the
Uniform Commercial Code a "Code" in the continental sense. He
has stated:
The U.C.C. is sufficiently pre-emptive and comprehensive to
meet the test of a true code. It takes as its set the rules which are
needed to build the basic framework to control the flow of goods
from producer to ultimate consumer. This set, traditionally
recognized in most civil law countries as being sufficiently inclusive to be codified, seems broad enough to prevent its policies
from being defeated by requiring too much dependence on outside, relevant law.2 5
Professor Kripke, on the other hand; has taken the position that:
... the express statutory injunctions to give effect to all of the
nonstatutory influences for growth are so strong that continental
codification is a misleading analogy. The draftsmen did not intend
that the solution to problems within the ambit of the Code must
be found in the confines of the statute.26
The express statutory injunction Kripke refers to is section 1-103,
which provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the la'I\' merchant and the
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
25 Hawk.land, Article 9 Methodology, 9 WAYNE L. Rm•. 531, 534 (1963); accord, Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw &: CoNTOIP. Pr.on.
330 (1951); Vold, Construing the Uniform Commercial Code: Its Ow11 Twi11 Keys: Uniformity and Growth, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 49, 62-66 (1964).
26 Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Unifom1 Commercial Code,
1962 U. !LL. L.F. 321, 331; cf. B. CAru>ozo, The Growth of the Law, in SELECTED
WRITINGS 186 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
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fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy,
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions.
Thus it becomes necessary to look to pre-Code law.
Under pre-Code law governing chattel mortgages, a transfer of the
mortgage note alone effects a transfer of both the note and the mortgage with it.27 The rationale for this rule is that a mortgage is a mere
incident of the debt it secures, and thus an assignment of the debt
carries the mortgage with it.28 Several prominent Code commentators
have advocated application of this rule to transfers of notes governed
by the Uniform Commercial Code.29
Section 1-103 affords both a statutory basis for this view and a
ground for questioning it. As the section permits reference to principles of general law to supplement the Code, it would seem that
reference could be made to mortgage law to resolve the problems arising
from the secured party transferring only the note. It must be remem·
bered, however, that at "general law" the mortgage was but one form
of personal property security. Other popular security devices were the
pledge and the conditional sales contract. As to the former, the effect
of a note-only transfer mirrored that of the chattel mortgage; 30 as to
the latter, however, the courts were divided as to the effect of the
transfer of the note only where it was secured by a conditional sales
contract.
A conditional sale differs from a chattel mortgage in that it involves
a matter of title and not of lien.31 In a conditional sale, possession
is delivered to the debtor-buyer, but title and general ownership remain in the secured party-seller pending payment of the purchase
price. When full payment is made, both title and general ownership
pass to the buyer. Accordingly, in determining the effect of a note·only
transfer in a conditional sale context, the focal point is the effect on
the title held by the secured party, not on the mortgage lien.
There are three views, each of which has judicial support, as to
the effect upon the title to the property of an assignment of a note
27 See, e.g., Cherno v. Dutch Am. Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 1965):
Murrell v. Griswold, 338 P .2d 150, 153 (Okla. 1959).
28 See, e.g., National Live Stock Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 203 U.S. 296 (l!JOG): G.
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES

29
80

Sl

§ 224 (1951).

Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 2, at 271-73.
See R.EsTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 29 (1941).
See 3 L. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES §§ 932·76 (6th ed. 1933).
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given on a contract of conditional sale. One line of cases takes the
position that transfer of the note is an election to enforce payment
thereof and consequently an abandonment of the reserved title. The
effect of this position is to vest title in the vendee.32 A second judicial
position is that transfer of the note does not disturb the title, that it
simply remains in the vendor-secured party.33 The third view is that
transfer of the note automatically transfers the security of the conditional bill of sale and vests the title to the property in the holder
of the note.34
It seems that the effect of a transfer of a note only, ·which has been
given pursuant to a security agreement, would depend upon (I)
whether the security agreement assumed the form of a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales contract; and (2) if the latter, which of the
above three views the jurisdiction had adopted. This confusing result
runs contrary to at least two of the basic tenets of the Code: uniformity and substance over form.
Section 1-102 of the Code sets out its purposes and policies. According to the Chairman of the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code, "the most important of the underlying
purposes and policies of the 'Uniform' Commercial Code is •.. 'to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.' " 311 Secondly,
the official Comment to section 9-101 states in part:
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security
devices, based largely on form, are not retained ....
Under this Article, distinctions based on form •.• are no longer
controlling.
Yet, by reference to general principles of law in the instant situation,
the law as to the effect of a note-only transfer would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and distinctions would be based on the form
of the transaction. Accordingly, it is submitted that section 1-103 does
not permit reference to pre-Code law to determine tl1e effect of a
note-only transfer, because such law does not "supplement" the Code's
32 See, e.g., Bradley v. Cassels, 117 Ga. 517, 43 S.E. 857 (1903); Winton Motor Carri:igc
Co. v. Broadway Auto. Co., 65 Wash. 650, 118 P. 817 (1911).
33 See, e.g., Voges v. Ward, 98 Fla. 304, 123 So. 785 (1929); Ross·Mcchan Br:ikc·Shoc
Foundry Co. v. Pascagoula Ice Co., 72 Miss. 608, 18 So. 36-i (1895).
34 See, e.g., Waterbury Trust Co. v. Weisman, 94 Conn. 210, 108 A. 550 (1919);
Zedennan v. Thomson, 17 N.M. 56, 121 P. 609 (1912).
35 Schnader, Why the Commercial Code Should Be "Uniform", 20 WASn. &: LEE L
REv. 237 (1963).
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· provlSlons. Rather, in this instance, these general principles of law
have been "displaced by the particular provisions of this Act." 30
Those who view the UCC as a true Code would advocate looking
within the statutory text to determine the effect of a note-only transfer.37 In this context, one should consider the effect of the perfection
sections of the Code on this type of transfer. As has been mentioned
above, while chattel paper may be perfected by filing (section 9-304)
or possession (section 9-305), section 9-308 problems arise unless the
latter method is used. 38 Where, however, only the note is transferred,
is perfection by possession possible? In other words, can a security interest in chattel paper be perfected by the secured party's possession
of only the note? In a recent law review article, several leading Code
authorities answered this inquiry in the affirmative; 89 however, they
cited no case law or Code provision to support their view. The Code
nowhere defines possession, nor has any reported case meaningfully
discussed this concept. Section 9-305 speaks in terms of possession of
"the" collateral. This would seem to indicate that physical control is
essential to perfection by possession. Such a reading also is consistent
with the notice function served by perfection-be it by possession
or by filing. Possession of a note would not put third parties on notice
that the possessor had a security interest in chattel paper, unless the
note referred to and incorporated the security agreement.
Several legal ·writers have seized upon the introductory language
of the official Comment to section 9-305, the primary perfection by
possession provision, to espouse the view that the common law principles for the definition of pledge are applicable to perfection by
possession under the Code.40 To speak in terms of "principles" of the
body of case law dealing with what constitutes a pledge is somewhat
misleading. At common law, the question of sufficient possession was
largely a case by case detennination. 41 No pre-Code case expressly
considered whether the transfer of possession of a note effects a pledge
not only of the note but also of the mortgage securing it. There is,
36

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103.

See Franklin, supra note 25, at 338-39.
38 See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
39 Coogan, Kripke &: Weiss, supra note 2, at 271-73.
40 See, e.g., Lee, Perfection and Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 80
BANKING L.J. 473, 492 (1963); Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 806, 850 (1961).
41 L. JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITY AND PLEDGES § 23 (3d ed. 1912); cf. Note, Security
Interests Under Pledge Agreements, 51 YALE L.J. 431, 432 n.4 (1942).
87
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however, a common law doctrine that bears on this issue: delivery
must have been as complete as the nature of the property permits.42
Since possession of only the note probably ·will not constitute
sufficient possession to perfect a security interest in the chattel paper,
it becomes necessary to consider whether the transferee is adequately
protected by filing if he does not take possession of the note. There
are serious problems inherent in perfecting a security interest in
chattel paper by filing. In addition to the possibility already discussed
that under section 9-308 a purchaser of chattel paper takes free of any
security interest if he bought the paper in the course of his business
and without knowledge of the security interest,43 there is also some
likelihood that the note, if negotiable, vlill be negotiated to a holder
in due course. Under section 9-309, a holder in due course takes
priority over all earlier security interests-even those perfected by the
filing of a financing statement. Furthermore, such a holder, by virtue
of the mortgage law doctrine that a transfer of the debt carries with
it the mortgage, would have both the debt and the security agreement.
In light of these difficulties in perfecting a security interest in both
the note and the security agreement where only the former is transferred, perhaps the transferee should attempt to disclaim the mortgage
law doctrine that debt carries with it the mortgage. In other ·words,
perhaps he should seek to have the transfer of the note to him treated
as only a transfer of the instrument and not a transfer of the chattel
paper. But if the doctrine is read into the Code via section 1-103, can
it be disclaimed? The use of the word "shall" in section 1-103 seems
to make the supplementation mandatory. While perhaps under section
1-102 the parties could by agreement displace the section 1-103 reference; as a practical matter, such an agreement seems unlikely.

III.

TRANSFER OF SECURITY ONLY

Before determining the effect of a note-only transfer, it is necessary
consider the effect given to the transfer of only the security. The
case of W. W. Kimball Co. v. Mellon« illustrates the need for this
inquiry. In that case, there ·was a ·written contract for the conditional
sale of a piano in connection with which the purchasers gave promissory notes endorsed with a notation concerning both the contract and
to

42 See, e.g., Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir. 1945);
'Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wash. 2d 204, 216, 109 P.2d 312, SIS (1941).
43 See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
44 80 Wis. 133, 48 N.W. 1100 (1891).
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the retention of title by the seller. The seller assigned the contract
to a corporation and transferred by endorsement the promissory notes
to a third party, who had no notice of the transfer of the conditional
sale contract. Obviously, in such a situation, both a note-only transfer
and a security-only transfer cannot result in a transfer of both the note
and security. Equally clear, if a note-only transfer results in a transfer
of the security as well, a transfer of the security to another party
should have no effect.
The pre-Code law on security-only transfers did not vary with the
type of security involved. Regardless of whether the instrument trans·
£erred was a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales contract, most cases
held the transfer to be of no effect.45 When the transfer was a mere assignment for security, the reasons advanced by the courts in reaching
this result corresponded to those set out in the above discussion of the
note-only transfer.46 Where the transfer was absolute, it was struck
down as a conversion.
Security under the Uniform Commercial Code takes two separate
and distinct forms: security by written agreement and security by pos·
session of the items of collateral. The Code is silent as to the effect
of a transfer of security that takes the form of a security agreement.
Section 9-302(2) provides for the assignment of a security interest. The
term security interest is not, however, identical to a security agree·
ment. As the latter is defined in terms of the former, 47 it is apparent
that the draftsmen of the Code did not intend that the terms be used
interchangeably. This, however, does not mean that a secured party
may not transfer or assign a security agreement but merely that the
rights of the transferee would not be governed by section 9-302(2).
Thus, the consideration of such a transfer exposes another gap in the
coverage of the Code.
Surprisingly, there is a Code provision on transfer by a pledgee.
Section 9-207(2)(e) deals with the rights of a secured party to repledge
the collateral. It provides: "[T]he secured party may repledge the
collateral upon terms which do not impair the debtor's right to re·
deem it." Implicit in this language is recognition of the proposition
that the repledge of the collateral does not effect a transfer of the note
45 See, e.g., National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Evans, 118 Kan. 656, 658, 236 P. 447, 448
(1925); 2 L. JONES, supra note 31, § 505.
46 See notes 19-43 and accompanying text supra.
47 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(h) which provides that .. '[s]ecurity agree•
ment' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest."
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secured thereby. OthenV"ise, the limitation on such repledges would
to a large extent be mere surplusage. As the debtor could redeem
his property by satisfying his obligation directly to the repledgee, no
such repledge coUJ.d "impair the debtor's right to redeem ...." Also
implicit in the above quoted Code excerpt is the principle that the
secured party should not be permitted, by his unilateral acts, to harm
the debtor.
Theoretically a security interest in a security agreement is not in
and of itself inconsistent with the provisions of tlie Code. Within the
terminology of the Code, the nature of a security agreement as collateral is that of a general intangible: that is, "personal property • • .
other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents
and instruments."48 A security interest in a general intangible can be
perfected by filing a financing statement; perfection by possession
is not permitted.49 As a practical matter, however, an assignment of a
security agreement is of little value unless it carries with it the note.
As has already been indicated, the language of section 9-207 (2) indicates that a repledge does not achieve this result. In this regard,
there is no reason for distinguishing between possessory and nonpossessory security interests. Furthermore, unless such an assignment
carries the note with it, it would be unfair to the debtor to give effect
to the assignment. Since there is no protection to the debtor corresponding to that afforded by the limitations in section 9-207 (2), such
transfers of the security alone should be regarded as having no legal
effect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the absence of specific Code provisions dealing with transfers by secured parties, amendments to the Code are not warranted.
Professor Steinheimer has observed:
At this juncture, the real value of the ·wealth of ·written
material on the Code . . . lies not in triggering instant amendment of the Code, but rather in focusing the attention of judges
and lawyers on potential problems under the Code so that such
persons will be better able to handle these problems properly
if and when they arise. This complex statute will never be flawless, but constant tinkering could well do more harm than good.
48 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE

§ 9·106.

49 See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE §

9-302.
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Most of the defects so far discovered can certainly be handled by
intelligent interpretation of the statute as it now stands.Go

It is submitted that an "intelligent interpretation of the statute
as it now stands" would be that the transfer of a note transfers both
the note and the security, and that the transfer of security only is of
no effect, except as provided in section 9-207 (2). This is consistent
with present Code provisions, the principles of the Code, and preCode law. While such a result will necessitate judicial recognition that
possession of the note is also possession of the security agreement given
therewith, it seems clearly preferable to the alternatives: that the
security interest vanishes when a note-only transfer is made; or that
the transferor secured party, although he no longer has the debt, continues to have a security interest in the collateral.
50 Steinheimer, The Uniform Commercial Code Comes of Age, 65 Mien. L. REV, 1275,
1279 (i.967).

